'Heroic leniency': Iran and the United States

In the diplomatic negotiations that are quite unexpectedly blossoming between Iran and the United States, one has to say that the Iranians have shown the greater capacity for verbal formulas that grab popular imagination.

When the new president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, suggested that Iran would be willing to engage in diplomacy with what the Iranians used to call the Great Satan, we all held our breath until we all knew if Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, would endorse these efforts.

On Sept. 17, Khamenei said in a speech, "I agree with what I called heroic leniency years ago because such an approach is very good and necessary in certain situations, as long as we stick to our main principles."

Armed with that endorsement of heroic leniency, Rouhani went to the United Nations to start the process. He and U.S. President Barack Obama danced carefully in the media and avoided going so far as to meet publicly. However, both sides agreed to have U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet publicly and privately to explore common ground.

One result was the Iranian suggestion that Obama telephone Rouhani, which he did. Rouhani said the phone call showed "constructive interaction." Obama no doubt agreed with the formulation. But from constructive interaction to successful negotiations is a long distance, with not much time to complete the trajectory. The question for both sides is how "lenient" they can be in their "constructive interaction" and still "stick to (their) main principles." It does seem to require heroism.

It appears that both Rouhani and Obama would like these negotiations to be successful for the same three reasons on each side. First, they both feel that warfare would be a disaster for their own countries. Second, they think that a success in these negotiations would strengthen their hand considerably in internal politics. Third, they are keenly aware of the limits of their real power, both personal and national. Failure would weaken them immensely, both personally and nationally.

Still, the two men find considerable (perhaps I should say formidable) opposition in their own camps. Each side needs to be able to persuade its home audience that it got the better of the deal in any final agreement. Generally speaking, true win-win resolutions of conflicts are rare, and this is a particularly contentious and long-lasting controversy — quite a nasty one, in fact.

So we must explore how much room there is for "heroic leniency." The short answer is, not much. First of all, there is deep distrust on both sides. The Iranians know that the United States has been trying to arrange regime changes ever since the CIA successfully conspired to oust Mohammed Mossadegh as prime minister in 1953, a misdeed at last acknowledged by Obama. They believe that the United States is still in this game, although Obama now says it isn't — or isn't any longer.

The United States remembers the seizure of its embassy in Tehran in 1979 and the long imprisonment in the embassy of its personnel. Furthermore, the United States believes that the current Iranian regime has been trying for quite some time to become a nuclear power, despite multiple denials by Iranian authorities, including Khamenei.

The hawks in both countries believe that nothing has changed and that no diplomatic statements by the other side are to be given the least credence. Let us start with the best-case scenario. Let us assume that Rouhani and Obama mean what they are saying — that is, that the hawks are wrong and that both men are trying honestly to find a formula that would prove the hawks wrong.

What would they have to do to prove the hawks wrong? Quite a lot. The bottom line for the Iranians is that the United States recognize that they have the same rights concerning nuclear energy that all other countries have under international law, which is the right to enrich uranium. This doesn't mean that Iran necessarily has to develop nuclear armaments. The Iranians note that many countries (for example, South Korea and Brazil) have levels of uranium enrichment that the United States and, of course, Israel insist be denied Iran. From the Iranian point of view, this is not only a breach of international law but also an affront to their dignity.

The bottom line for the United States seems to be some verifiable guarantee that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons. It is not at all clear for how many years (forever?) the United States would expect such a commitment. One of the problems here is that it is not so easy to verify the implementation of such a commitment.

The negotiations concerning Syria's political future, which is being called Geneva 2, are perhaps key to the possibility of an Iranian-U.S. accord. The Russians, who have played the prime role in heading off U.S. military action in Syria, are arguing for the inclusion of Iran among the participants. Should they succeed in convincing the United States and the Western Europeans that this is a sensible idea, it will go some way to reassuring the Iranians that they are being taken seriously as a participant in decisions concerning their region.

But Geneva 2 may never take place, with or without Iran. At the moment, the so-called Syrian rebels are resisting participation, and if some do take part, it is not clear whether they could really make commitments for the main fighting forces in Syria.

Iran and the United States have important common interests in the region, in matters concerning Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Syria and the Palestinian territories. But to assert this objectively does not mean that this analysis will carry the day. The odds, in fact, seem small. But then a few weeks ago, I would have said the same about the developments in Syria. There may yet be surprises.