U.S.
When it comes to possible United States military action in Syria — which appears to be stalled for the moment — a natural question is why the U.S. has refused to work through the United Nations Security Council. The answer is simple: as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power said, there is no "available path forward" at the Security Council, given the obviously correct belief that Russia would veto any U.S. attempt to obtain Security Council authorization. Why does Russia have this power? The answer is also simple: The then-Soviet Union, to which Russia is treated as the successor state, along with Great Britain, France, China and the United States, were the five major victorious powers almost 70 years ago after World War II. As a result, when establishing the United Nations in 1945, they awarded themselves the power to prevent what at least one of these powers would regard as precipitous or even merely unwise actions. The United States, for example, has cast many such vetoes with regard to protecting its ally Israel against resolutions of censure with regard to its post-1967 occupation of the West Bank. Here it is the Soviet Union acting to protect its ally against something far more significant than a mere expression of unhappiness. But the explanation for their power is the same. No other countries in the world can exercise such power within the Security Council, including India, Germany or Brazil, to name only three obvious countries which can claim, in our 21st century world, to be least as important as France.
Many people who wish the United Nations well — unlike American “neo-conservatives” who have only contempt for the institution — strongly believe that the 1945 settlement has generated institutional atherosclerosis. Just as hardening of the arteries can kill human beings, so can its institutional variant lead to various forms of pathology and, in the worst case, the death of the institution in question. That is surely one threat of the Obama administration’s desired policy. That is, given what the United States views as the pathological consequences of the veto system in the Security Council, its response is, basically, to move outside the United Nations apparatus and to rely on a venerable tradition of “self-help.” Its hope is that American intervention will gain the description given by an international commission to NATO bombing in Serbia during the 1990s —“illegal but legitimate.”
There is a striking difference in the perception by almost all Americans of the United Nations Charter and the international system established under its auspices, on the one hand, and the United States Constitution, on the other. There is frank and open discussion of the weaknesses of the United Nations Charter and the great, even dire, need for institutional reformation in order to take account of twenty-first century realities. One huge problem is that so long as the veto power is available with regard to any proposed reforms — including modification or even elimination of the power — then reform might prove impossible. Still, at least there is serious discussion of what might have to be done in order to maintain the relevance of the United Nations into the future.
The situation is entirely different with regard to the United States Constitution. Most Americans treat the Constitution as an almost sacred document, worthy of veneration. Just as President Barack Obama capitulated during his 2008 campaign to the now seemingly-mandatory requirement that political leaders wear American flag lapel pins, he resolutely refuses even to hint that the United States is plagued by having to live in the twenty first century under an eighteenth-century document drafted not only in extraordinarily different times, but under a variety of presumptions that most Americans, 225 years later, do not share, including the desirability of rule by benevolent elites. Indeed, one of the many dismaying aspects of that 2012 presidential election is that President Obama and former-Governor Romney, both graduates of the Harvard Law School, had literally nothing to say about the degree to which our present political "gridlock" is caused in significant measure by the Constitution.
The United States Constitution fails two essential twenty-first century tests. First, it is strikingly undemocratic. When United States presidents, whether George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama, talk about the American commitment to spreading “democracy” around the world, they never engage in serious discussion of what that term actually means — and whether the United States is adequately “democratic.” The United States has a political system that was intentionally designed to make it difficult, at best, to pass any legislation at all. It may be wise to constrain legislatures, but making it difficult to legislate does not promote “democracy.” Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Constitution plays an important role in the “crisis of governability.” This crisis can be measured both by the widespread contempt that most Americans, regardless of political persuasion, have for Congress — even the most “favorable” recent poll shows that only 20 percent of all Americans “approve” of Congress, while over 70 percent “disapprove” — and by the altogether correct view that the Congress is basically incapable of passing legislation that responds adequately to any of the great challenges facing us today. This almost inevitably leads to greater calls for action by the Executive Branch. There is widespread talk, for example, that President Obama may order military strikes on Syria even if he fails to get the support of both legislative houses.
That would generate two major crises, one political, the other constitutional. That is, not only would there very likely be public outrage at Obama’s refusal, unlike U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, to feel bound by the legislative outcome, but there would also be, I am certain, calls for his impeachment. And this time, unlike the farce of the 1998 Clinton impeachment, the most substantial issues of any constitutional order — who has the right to make decisions about war and peace, life and death? — would be implicated. But what if the President’s defenders emphasized basically what Samantha Power said about the Security Council: that the American system of government is sufficiently broken that we ought not to expect presidents to be fully bound by its forms in matters of the highest national importance. Consider that the current House is in the control of Republicans who, as a party, received two million fewer votes, nationally, than did their Democratic opponents in the 2012 elections. And the Senate, of course, grants Wyoming the same voting power as the 70-times-as-populous California. If “democracy” is truly our mantra, why should either of these bodies necessarily be able to block the president from doing what he believes is crucial to preserve the world order with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons?
As a matter of brute fact, American presidents since Harry Truman have exerted varieties of unilateral power, all based, even if not publicly articulated, on the near-disdain that post-World War II presidents have had for Congress as a truly trustworthy decision-making body. John F. Kennedy unilaterally took the world to the brink of thermonuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis 51 years ago and, for better or worse, he established this model for what it means to be a “decisive” Chief Executive. Whatever the particular outcome of President Obama’s search for congressional approval, it would be an unequivocal victory if it led to a candid discussion of what kind of Constitution we really want to be governed by, as well as further discussion of what kinds of reforms are desirable within the United Nations and how to achieve them.
The United States Constitution fails two essential twenty-first century tests. First, it is strikingly undemocratic. When United States presidents, whether George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama, talk about the American commitment to spreading “democracy” around the world, they never engage in serious discussion of what that term actually means — and whether the United States is adequately “democratic.” The United States has a political system that was intentionally designed to make it difficult, at best, to pass any legislation at all. It may be wise to constrain legislatures, but making it difficult to legislate does not promote “democracy.” Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Constitution plays an important role in the “crisis of governability.” This crisis can be measured both by the widespread contempt that most Americans, regardless of political persuasion, have for Congress — even the most “favorable” recent poll shows that only 20 percent of all Americans “approve” of Congress, while over 70 percent “disapprove” — and by the altogether correct view that the Congress is basically incapable of passing legislation that responds adequately to any of the great challenges facing us today. This almost inevitably leads to greater calls for action by the Executive Branch. There is widespread talk, for example, that President Obama may order military strikes on Syria even if he fails to get the support of both legislative houses.
That would generate two major crises, one political, the other constitutional. That is, not only would there very likely be public outrage at Obama’s refusal, unlike U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, to feel bound by the legislative outcome, but there would also be, I am certain, calls for his impeachment. And this time, unlike the farce of the 1998 Clinton impeachment, the most substantial issues of any constitutional order — who has the right to make decisions about war and peace, life and death? — would be implicated. But what if the President’s defenders emphasized basically what Samantha Power said about the Security Council: that the American system of government is sufficiently broken that we ought not to expect presidents to be fully bound by its forms in matters of the highest national importance. Consider that the current House is in the control of Republicans who, as a party, received two million fewer votes, nationally, than did their Democratic opponents in the 2012 elections. And the Senate, of course, grants Wyoming the same voting power as the 70-times-as-populous California. If “democracy” is truly our mantra, why should either of these bodies necessarily be able to block the president from doing what he believes is crucial to preserve the world order with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons?
As a matter of brute fact, American presidents since Harry Truman have exerted varieties of unilateral power, all based, even if not publicly articulated, on the near-disdain that post-World War II presidents have had for Congress as a truly trustworthy decision-making body. John F. Kennedy unilaterally took the world to the brink of thermonuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis 51 years ago and, for better or worse, he established this model for what it means to be a “decisive” Chief Executive. Whatever the particular outcome of President Obama’s search for congressional approval, it would be an unequivocal victory if it led to a candid discussion of what kind of Constitution we really want to be governed by, as well as further discussion of what kinds of reforms are desirable within the United Nations and how to achieve them.
The United States Constitution fails two essential twenty-first century tests. First, it is strikingly undemocratic. When United States presidents, whether George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama, talk about the American commitment to spreading “democracy” around the world, they never engage in serious discussion of what that term actually means — and whether the United States is adequately “democratic.” The United States has a political system that was intentionally designed to make it difficult, at best, to pass any legislation at all. It may be wise to constrain legislatures, but making it difficult to legislate does not promote “democracy.” Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Constitution plays an important role in the “crisis of governability.” This crisis can be measured both by the widespread contempt that most Americans, regardless of political persuasion, have for Congress — even the most “favorable” recent poll shows that only 20 percent of all Americans “approve” of Congress, while over 70 percent “disapprove” — and by the altogether correct view that the Congress is basically incapable of passing legislation that responds adequately to any of the great challenges facing us today. This almost inevitably leads to greater calls for action by the Executive Branch. There is widespread talk, for example, that President Obama may order military strikes on Syria even if he fails to get the support of both legislative houses.
That would generate two major crises, one political, the other constitutional. That is, not only would there very likely be public outrage at Obama’s refusal, unlike U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, to feel bound by the legislative outcome, but there would also be, I am certain, calls for his impeachment. And this time, unlike the farce of the 1998 Clinton impeachment, the most substantial issues of any constitutional order — who has the right to make decisions about war and peace, life and death? — would be implicated. But what if the President’s defenders emphasized basically what Samantha Power said about the Security Council: that the American system of government is sufficiently broken that we ought not to expect presidents to be fully bound by its forms in matters of the highest national importance. Consider that the current House is in the control of Republicans who, as a party, received two million fewer votes, nationally, than did their Democratic opponents in the 2012 elections. And the Senate, of course, grants Wyoming the same voting power as the 70-times-as-populous California. If “democracy” is truly our mantra, why should either of these bodies necessarily be able to block the president from doing what he believes is crucial to preserve the world order with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons?
As a matter of brute fact, American presidents since Harry Truman have exerted varieties of unilateral power, all based, even if not publicly articulated, on the near-disdain that post-World War II presidents have had for Congress as a truly trustworthy decision-making body. John F. Kennedy unilaterally took the world to the brink of thermonuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis 51 years ago and, for better or worse, he established this model for what it means to be a “decisive” Chief Executive. Whatever the particular outcome of President Obama’s search for congressional approval, it would be an unequivocal victory if it led to a candid discussion of what kind of Constitution we really want to be governed by, as well as further discussion of what kinds of reforms are desirable within the United Nations and how to achieve them.
The United States Constitution fails two essential twenty-first century tests. First, it is strikingly undemocratic. When United States presidents, whether George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama, talk about the American commitment to spreading “democracy” around the world, they never engage in serious discussion of what that term actually means — and whether the United States is adequately “democratic.” The United States has a political system that was intentionally designed to make it difficult, at best, to pass any legislation at all. It may be wise to constrain legislatures, but making it difficult to legislate does not promote “democracy.” Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Constitution plays an important role in the “crisis of governability.” This crisis can be measured both by the widespread contempt that most Americans, regardless of political persuasion, have for Congress — even the most “favorable” recent poll shows that only 20 percent of all Americans “approve” of Congress, while over 70 percent “disapprove” — and by the altogether correct view that the Congress is basically incapable of passing legislation that responds adequately to any of the great challenges facing us today. This almost inevitably leads to greater calls for action by the Executive Branch. There is widespread talk, for example, that President Obama may order military strikes on Syria even if he fails to get the support of both legislative houses.
That would generate two major crises, one political, the other constitutional. That is, not only would there very likely be public outrage at Obama’s refusal, unlike U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, to feel bound by the legislative outcome, but there would also be, I am certain, calls for his impeachment. And this time, unlike the farce of the 1998 Clinton impeachment, the most substantial issues of any constitutional order — who has the right to make decisions about war and peace, life and death? — would be implicated. But what if the President’s defenders emphasized basically what Samantha Power said about the Security Council: that the American system of government is sufficiently broken that we ought not to expect presidents to be fully bound by its forms in matters of the highest national importance. Consider that the current House is in the control of Republicans who, as a party, received two million fewer votes, nationally, than did their Democratic opponents in the 2012 elections. And the Senate, of course, grants Wyoming the same voting power as the 70-times-as-populous California. If “democracy” is truly our mantra, why should either of these bodies necessarily be able to block the president from doing what he believes is crucial to preserve the world order with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons?
As a matter of brute fact, American presidents since Harry Truman have exerted varieties of unilateral power, all based, even if not publicly articulated, on the near-disdain that post-World War II presidents have had for Congress as a truly trustworthy decision-making body. John F. Kennedy unilaterally took the world to the brink of thermonuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis 51 years ago and, for better or worse, he established this model for what it means to be a “decisive” Chief Executive. Whatever the particular outcome of President Obama’s search for congressional approval, it would be an unequivocal victory if it led to a candid discussion of what kind of Constitution we really want to be governed by, as well as further discussion of what kinds of reforms are desirable within the United Nations and how to achieve them.
The United States Constitution fails two essential twenty-first century tests. First, it is strikingly undemocratic. When United States presidents, whether George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama, talk about the American commitment to spreading “democracy” around the world, they never engage in serious discussion of what that term actually means — and whether the United States is adequately “democratic.” The United States has a political system that was intentionally designed to make it difficult, at best, to pass any legislation at all. It may be wise to constrain legislatures, but making it difficult to legislate does not promote “democracy.” Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Constitution plays an important role in the “crisis of governability.” This crisis can be measured both by the widespread contempt that most Americans, regardless of political persuasion, have for Congress — even the most “favorable” recent poll shows that only 20 percent of all Americans “approve” of Congress, while over 70 percent “disapprove” — and by the altogether correct view that the Congress is basically incapable of passing legislation that responds adequately to any of the great challenges facing us today. This almost inevitably leads to greater calls for action by the Executive Branch. There is widespread talk, for example, that President Obama may order military strikes on Syria even if he fails to get the support of both legislative houses.
That would generate two major crises, one political, the other constitutional. That is, not only would there very likely be public outrage at Obama’s refusal, unlike U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, to feel bound by the legislative outcome, but there would also be, I am certain, calls for his impeachment. And this time, unlike the farce of the 1998 Clinton impeachment, the most substantial issues of any constitutional order — who has the right to make decisions about war and peace, life and death? — would be implicated. But what if the President’s defenders emphasized basically what Samantha Power said about the Security Council: that the American system of government is sufficiently broken that we ought not to expect presidents to be fully bound by its forms in matters of the highest national importance. Consider that the current House is in the control of Republicans who, as a party, received two million fewer votes, nationally, than did their Democratic opponents in the 2012 elections. And the Senate, of course, grants Wyoming the same voting power as the 70-times-as-populous California. If “democracy” is truly our mantra, why should either of these bodies necessarily be able to block the president from doing what he believes is crucial to preserve the world order with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons?
As a matter of brute fact, American presidents since Harry Truman have exerted varieties of unilateral power, all based, even if not publicly articulated, on the near-disdain that post-World War II presidents have had for Congress as a truly trustworthy decision-making body. John F. Kennedy unilaterally took the world to the brink of thermonuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis 51 years ago and, for better or worse, he established this model for what it means to be a “decisive” Chief Executive. Whatever the particular outcome of President Obama’s search for congressional approval, it would be an unequivocal victory if it led to a candid discussion of what kind of Constitution we really want to be governed by, as well as further discussion of what kinds of reforms are desirable within the United Nations and how to achieve them.
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