Can the US and Iran strike a nuke deal?

Geneive Abdo is a fellow in the Middle East program at the Stimson Center and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Many stars have aligned to make this moment an opportune time to resolve two conflicts in the Middle East -- the Syrian civil war and Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon. A new, more moderate faction is in power in Iran, led by President Hassan Rouhani, who has vowed to break the deadlock with the West over Iran,s nuclear program. Not only does Rouhani have the support of key figures within the regime, but more important, he has the backing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

At the same time, a diplomatic settlement could materialize to end the war in Syria. Such a settlement would have to include Iran, and the outcome is likely to dispense with President Bashar al-Assad while preserving remnants of his Alawite-led regime. Key officials in the Obama administration have signaled they are willing to give Iran a role in the negotiations -- something Tehran has demanded for many months. Iran views this scenario as advantageous: Even with Assad gone, Tehran would retain its footprint in Syria and its supply routes to Hezbollah, its key ally in Lebanon.

Iran could use Assad as a bargaining chip in nuclear negotiations and appear to be giving up a key weapon. Therefore, from Iran's perspective, there are many benefits to negotiating now on the nuclear issue to try to get some of the U.S., U.N. and European Union sanctions lifted. Sanction relief is Rouhani's top priority. Given that, Iran might agree to cap its uranium enrichment at lower levels than the current 20 percent and allow more transparency regarding its nuclear facilities and capability.

Another incentive for Iran's leaders to make a deal is that they understand and have acknowledged their own society's demands for sanction relief in order to improve the economy and end Iran's isolation from the rest of the world. Khamenei, in particular, appears to have reached the realization that his survival and that of the regime depend on substantive political and economic reform.

Farideh Farhi is an independent scholar and affiliate graduate faculty member at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She was most recently a public-policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

In Iran, there seems to be a political will to resolve the nuclear standoff. This political will involves determination on the part of the Rouhani administration as well as a rare domestic consensus that the president needs to be given a chance and internal support in his declared quest to both resolve the nuclear issue and reduce the hostility that was created in the West during the Ahmadinejad administration. What is less clear or is questionable is the existence of such a political will in the United States. Tehran is fully aware that the Obama administration is under pressure to remain recalcitrant on the demand that Iran end its enrichment program and on substantial easing of sanctions. But Obama's stand-down on Syria has created optimism that he may be keen on reducing tensions in the region as well as willing to ignore forces and countries that find benefit in continued hostilities between Iran and the U.S. As such, some sort of intermediate or initial agreement within the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) opening the path for bilateral talks is possible.

It should be noted that such an intermediate agreement almost happened in the immediate aftermath of the 2009 election but was derailed because of opposition in Iran over worries that such a deal with external players would open the path for further repression at home. The revamping of Iran's domestic dynamics after the 2013 presidential election and increased concern by many people in the U.S. regarding the potential for coercive diplomacy opening the path for another destructive war in the Middle East region has improved the prospects for a nuclear deal. 

A diplomatic solution will have to be based on flexibility and realistic assessment of what is possible on the part of both sides. The broad frames of an initial agreement have been extensively discussed in public. Furthermore, at least temporary limitations on Iran's 20 percent enrichment activities were placed on the table in previous negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. Tehran has been open to the implementation of the additional protocol, but it has been resistant to further International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its military installation at Parchin without some sort of agreement on the modality of the visit. Up to now, it has maintained a maximalist position regarding the easing of sanctions, calling for suspension of most sanctions in the first stages. This position is obviously unrealistic and will have to change. 

The United States, in turn, has been quite stingy in its willingness to reduce sanctions, fearing that any kind of substantial easing would make Iran uninterested in further talks and limitations on its nuclear program. But some sort of easing -- for instance, in relation to financial restrictions on the movement of Iranian dollars held abroad -- may get in return not only suspension of 20 percent enrichment but also further cooperation with the IAEA in its demand to visit Parchin. The U.S. has been unwilling to reveal its endgame in relation to Iran's enrichment program and whether the intent is to halt or limit it. Finally, the American demand for Iran to close or mothball Fordo, the under-mountain enrichment facility that is under IAEA inspection, while publicly maintaining that the option of militarily attacking Iran's nuclear facilities is on the table is simply unrealistic, given the fact that Fordo was created precisely in response to the declared military option. 

It is true that at this point there are other actions that can be taken to lessen the mistrust between the two countries. The U.S. agreement to allow Iran to be part of multinational talks on Syria will, for instance, impact Iran's threat perception and its fear that the U.S. is intent on regime change. Iran's lowering of its profile in Syria will, in turn, impact the image it has in the U.S. of being a troublemaker in the region. But the bottom line is that after 35 years of open hostility and 10 years of unfruitful and troubled negotiations, any kind of initial agreement on the nuclear file, no matter how limited, would be a truly significant step in shaking the hostile narratives that have become deeply institutionalized in both countries. In Iran, at least, it would go a long way in undermining the narrative that the nuclear issue is merely an excuse for increasing pressures and, ultimately, regime change.

Mark Fitzpatrick is the director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is also a founding member of the E.U. Non-Proliferation Consortium.

If Iran's nuclear program were entirely for peaceful purposes, then it would not be hard to find a solution. But unfortunately, that is not the case. The nuclear problem involves a fundamental clash of goals: Iran wants nuclear weapons capability, and the U.S. and its allies don't want Iran to have it. Neither side will totally capitulate, so the best that can be done is to strike a deal under which Iran maintains part of the capability it already possesses but accepts transparency measures and limitations sufficient to provide confidence that it could not quickly build a nuclear weapon. 

Just how quickly or slowly this should be is the area for negotiation. Iran will have to provide far more transparency, including 24/7 remote video monitoring of key nuclear facilities and adherence to international norms, including the Additional Protocol safeguards and rules about early notification of nuclear facilities. On the basis of Rouhani's election-campaign statements about transparency, there is reason to believe that Iran will be willing to go along with such measures.

But a deal will also require significant limits on the sensitive aspects of its nuclear program, which will be harder for him to sell domestically. At a minimum, the program should be frozen at its current status in terms of both quantity and quality of the operating centrifuges. The stockpile of enriched uranium, which is sufficient for at least six weapons if further enriched, will need to be shipped out of the country, as part of a trade deal, for example, or parts of it converted to forms that cannot easily be used for weapons. Iran will also have to forestall starting up its Arak reactor so it would not be able to make weapons-grade plutonium.

In exchange, Iran's six negotiating partners will have to offer significant sanction relief, particularly in the oil and financial sectors that are squeezing the nation most. The six powers will also have to address Iran's insistence on recognizing its so-called right to enrichment. In fact, the offers already tabled give an implicit recognition of this right, conditional on Iran's satisfying international concerns. The six will need to make this recognition explicit and specify what is required to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. The most objective criteria would be faithful implementation of the Additional Protocol, which would enable the IAEA to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Reza Marashi is the research director for the National Iranian American Council. He previously served in the Office of Iranian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

Prospects for a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear standoff look more realistic now than they have in years. Relative moderates occupy the executive branch in Washington and Tehran, and they both enjoy important institutional support at home. This helps empower leaders to take the kind of risks for peace that are necessary to break the deadlock. There's still much work to be done, but having two leaders who believe in the power of diplomacy is the most critical step toward turning hopes for peace into reality.

With both sides now willing to budge, finding the middle ground will be key. Following through on a step-by-step process based on reciprocity provides a framework for the least bad option: Both sides agree to take steps of equal value, each of which is reversible if Washington or Tehran violates the agreement.

By halting enrichment at the 20 percent level, converting its corresponding stockpile to fuel rods and limiting the operability of its underground nuclear facility in Qom, Tehran would take three important steps that reduce its breakout capability. By providing medical isotopes, providing sanction relief and acknowledging Iran's right to enrich on its own soil under the Additional Protocol, Washington would take three important steps that demonstrate its goal is to change what Iran does rather than what it is. 

Under this arrangement, both sides trade an equal number of concessions, which in turn builds trust, buys more time for negotiations to continue and helps disarms spoilers in Washington, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Brussels and Riyadh.