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The carnage that has once again become the standard headline out of Baghdad is an eerie throwback to 2006: Dozens of Iraqi civilians murdered daily in a relentless barrage of bomb attacks, executions and kidnappings. The protagonists are the same, and the domestic political blame-game has resumed. But despite some of the echoes, the Iraq of 2014 is not the Iraq of 2006, so it's worth asking whether the changes – the U.S. military withdrawal, for example – will set Iraq on a path back to the civil war of 2006.
What created the crisis of 2006?
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 obliterated the country's sectarian balance of power: Saddam Hussein's regime had privileged the Sunni minority, and it was from that now disenfranchised community that the first insurgency against the occupation emerged. The long-suffering Shia majority, on the other hand, were the beneficiaries of Iraqi democracy, using their greater number at the polls to return successive Shia-dominated governments. The Sunni insurgency, particularly after it absorbed Al-Qaeda fighters into its ranks, began directing its attacks not only against U.S. forces, but also against Shia civilians and holy sites.
What tipped the scales and sent Iraq into civil war in 2006?
There had been intermittent retaliatory attacks on Sunni civilians by Shia militias in the period preceding civil war, but their religious leaders, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, urged them to resist the provocation, mindful of their dominance in the political sphere. That all changed on February 22, 2006, when Sunni fighters blew up Al-Askari mosque in the Sunni town of Samarra, north of Baghdad. The golden-domed mosque is a sacred Shia shrine, where two of their 12 holy imams, or saints, are buried, and believed to be the site where the twelfth imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was last seen before he disappeared. Many Shia believe al-Mahdi was hidden by God and will remain in hiding until the end of days, when he will return to deliver justice. Iraq’s then-prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, declared a state of emergency and ordered three days of national mourning, calling on Shias not to respond to what Iraqi officials described as their own "September 11." By day's end, however, dozens were reported dead as Shia death squads went on a rampage of killing and kidnapping random Sunnis, in some cases setting afire Sunni homes with their residents trapped inside.
How did it end?
After almost a year of relentless killing and terrorizing of civilians that boosted the number of internally displaced Iraqis to more than 3 million, the U.S. military initiated a surge of troops that took control of whole neighborhoods or Sunni enclaves in Baghdad to prevent Shiite militias from entering. At the same time, the Sunni sheiks of Anbar entered into a pact with the U.S. military to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq, effectively putting thousands of Sunni insurgents on the U.S. payroll as "Sons of Iraq" – and making them responsible for security in their neighborhoods there and in Baghdad. The Shia-dominated government also promised an outreach that would allow for reconciliation by giving Sunnis a stake in the political process. At least, that's what the U.S. hoped. In reality, the Shia-dominated government and security forces did little to accommodate the Sunnis, leaving a wellspring of resentment that has grown more and more toxic in the years since the U.S. withdrawal.
Could this happen again?
Actually, the Askari mosque was bombed again in 2007, and while some Shias retaliated with attacks on Sunni mosques, there wasn’t the level of vitriol and hostility of the year before. Shias have been persecuted for centuries over their beliefs. Many Sunnis consider them to be heretics and apostates, and according to some Shia they were taught that "persecution will be their lot; that they are not destined to rule until the Mahdi comes." That narrative reinforces the calls by Shia religious leaders for calm and fortitude, but the goal of the Al-Qaeda elements is to provoke the Shia to abandon such restraint and plunge Iraq back into a civil war that prevents effective Shia rule. Shia political and military leaders have more to lose from a collapse into chaos, but it is possible the emotional impact of relentless attacks on their own communities can eventually push armed Shia groups to retaliate.
How would a renewed civil conflict be different without a U.S. presence?
Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki has asked for weapons to target the Al-Qaeda elements fighting for territory in Anbar province. As long as he maintains control over his security forces and is able to prevent militias from carrying out their own attacks, it is unlikely there will be a massive unleashing of killing like that witnessed in 2006. With the U.S. military out of the picture, the strongest military power in Iraq right now is Maliki and his Shia-dominated security forces, and their approach to the hostilities in Anbar and in the capital could prove decisive. They could choose to up military presence in Baghdad and impose curfews, as in the days of old. Because Maliki and his government have much to gain economically from forthcoming oil contracts, it is in their interest not to stoke sectarian fire – and therefore to increase pressure on allied militias to avoid retaliation. National elections are due to be held in April, and Maliki has to contend with expectations from outside – from Tehran as well as Washington – that the vote goes smoothly. Maliki looks likely to expand cooperation with Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar to retake territory claimed by Al-Qaeda and deter fighters crossing into the country from neighboring Syria.
What else can Maliki do?
Maliki is under pressure from all sides. His Shia coalition members remain unwilling to make concessions that would enable political reconciliation with Sunni legislators, who are resigning en masse to protest their alienation from the government. Maliki may lack the political will to give Sunni leaders a greater share of power despite realizing that their feelings of disenfranchisement create a more fertile environment for Al-Qaeda to operate in. Absent a change in the political equation – which is unlikely to happen quickly, if at all – Iraqis will likely endure a the rising daily body count for some time to come.
No group claimed responsibility for the blasts, the deadliest of which hit a crowded market in a Shia district
The US wants to help Baghdad recover ground lost to Al-Qaeda but not to further empower a sectarian prime minister
Security forces battle fighters in Anbar province, a Sunni stronghold under the sway of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates
Fears grow that elections next year could reignite sectarian tensions
Why the extremist movement has re-emerged in both countries and why it’s antagonizing local Sunnis
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