Divisions in the Gulf: Why Qatar and its neighbors are at odds

The decision by the Gulf Arab nations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors from the neighboring Gulf nation of Qatar is one of the most dramatic diplomatic rifts to hit the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for many years. This unprecedented move, though sudden, stems from disagreements over the past 18 months between Qatar and its neighbors regarding the tiny emirate’s increasingly active role across the Middle East, and in particular its stance on the Muslim Brotherhood and the fall of Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt in the summer of 2013.

Other grievances cited by Qatar's critics include the emirate's lukewarm support for the Al Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain in the face of three years of protests; its support for radical opposition groups in Syria; its attempts to muscle into the politics of Yemen, traditionally considered the preserve only of Saudi Arabia; and its quiet diplomatic efforts to open engagement between Hamas and Lebanon's Iran-backed, Assad-allied Hezbollah movement.

To top it off, the coverage by the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera television network, particularly during and after the Arab revolutions of 2011, ran counter to the general status quo consensus of the GCC, further heightening intra-GCC tensions.

Much of Qatar’s adventurous foreign policy was down to its former emir, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, and his prime minister, Sheik Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr al Thani. Since the early ’90s the two men set Qatar on a trajectory that forced it onto the world stage and made it a center of regional political activism, especially for Islamist political actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Sheik Hamad’s abdication in June 2013 raised hopes among more conservative neighbors that his son and successor, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad, would reduce Qatar’s more activist foreign policy and reintegrate Doha into the GCC consensus.

Following the signing of a collective security agreement by Sheik Tamim on Nov. 23, 2013, which was then ratified by all the GCC states in December, Qatar’s emir committed his nation to “ensure noninterference in the international affairs of any GCC countries … and not to support any party that threatens the security and stability of the GCC.”

The “party” of which the document spoke was the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emiratis in particular view as a fanatical organization bent on destroying stability and progress in the Gulf region, and a threat to the stability of their regime. By signing the document, Qatar was aware that its neighbors expected Doha to rethink its relationship with the Brotherhood. Yet Qatar continued to host members of the Brotherhood, particularly the Islamic scholar Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the movement's most eminent intellectuals.

Qaradawi's ongoing criticism of the Emiratis' support for the ouster of the Morsi government in Egypt last year has incensed the UAE and escalated tensions in its relations with Qatar in recent months. Despite Qatar's reducing its regional activist role in Libya, Syria and Egypt, and preventing Qaradawi from preaching live on television for a number of weeks, it has not been sufficient to placate the country's three neighbors. After three further consultations on the Nov. 23 document, they made the decision to remove their ambassadors.

Qatar’s response has been firm, noting that the decision taken by its “brothers … has nothing to do with the interests of their stability and security” and was related to “issues outside the Gulf Cooperation Council.” But Doha stopped short of a tit-for-tat withdrawal of its own ambassadors.

Further deterioration in relations with other Gulf states could prove problematic for Qatar, whose drive for modernization — and plans to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament — require billions of dollars of investment in infrastructure, and unfettered access by land, sea and air.  Some Saudi and Emirati commentators have warned that further escalation of tensions could prompt Qatar's neighbors to close airspace and land borders. Unlikely as that may be, the mere threat of it will give pause for thought in Doha.

Qatar now faces the challenge of finding ways to alleviate the pressure from its neighbors. As Doha's longstanding relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and Qaradawi has become a key source of tension, the withdrawal of ambassadors appears to present Doha with a challenge to downgrade its links with the Brotherhood in order to restore ties with the GCC countries. Failure to do so may escalate this crisis further and cause greater problems for the GCC.

Formed at the height of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the GCC has had the goal of pursuing collective security and greater cohesion among member states in the face of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But ever since its inception, it has been hamstrung by internal tensions, border disputes and mutual distrust.

Right now, the GCC’s core is the triad of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which take a very similar line on a number of security issues, most notably Iran, Egypt, Yemen and to some extent Syria. Outside of this core lies Kuwait, now playing the role of regional mediator and stabilizer, and whose ruler, Sheik Sabah al Ahmad al Sabah, has formed a close tie to Qatar’s 33-year-old Sheik Tamim. The sultanate of Oman has drifted far away from the GCC consensus, particularly on the question of Iran, where it has resolutely pursued its own policies in disregard of Riyadh’s wishes. And then there is Qatar, whose problems with the triad are all too evident.

This divide between the GCC's core and its periphery hampers its efforts at collective security and integration — an outcome that further weakens it and strengthens the GCC’s regional security rival, Iran. Tehran's progress in ballistic missile technology, its (so far temporary) rapprochement with the West over its nuclear program and its continuous support for Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah at the expense of Gulf interests in Syria have been a cause of alarm in the Gulf, particularly in Riyadh.

Yet instead of focusing its efforts outward, the GCC seems more concerned with engaging in very public, and embarrassing, internal housecleaning — a spectacle that, no doubt, raises smiles in the corridors of power in Tehran.