Iran and the US play nuclear chicken in Vienna

A momentous game of chicken is unfolding in a five-star hotel in Vienna as Iran and representatives of the international community enter what may be the final weeks of negotiations over a long-term nuclear agreement.

In dueling op-eds and YouTube videos, Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have each accused the other side of making excessive demands and warned, in near-identical language, that a “historic opportunity” to resolve one of the world’s most important security issues risks being lost.

But theatrics and public diplomacy aside, there are reasons for both optimism and concern as the delegations square off in Vienna and try to meet a July 20 deadline to conclude an agreement. That deadline marks the expiry date of the interim accord signed last November, which would compel the two sides to renew respective freezes on new sanctions and on the expansion of uranium-enrichment capacity that were adopted to enable the current talks.

Reasons for optimism stem from the obvious benefits of a deal for both Iran and the international community.

Burdened by sanctions and jittery about the challenge of the extremist Islamic State movement to its allies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Iran needs an agreement that will boost its economy and public confidence in its clerical leadership.

The United States and the rest of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) want a deal that ensures that Iran cannot easily develop nuclear weapons for years to come to prevent an escalatory spiral of fuel-cycle proliferation by Saudi Arabia and other foes of Iran in a region fracturing along ethnic and religious lines.

But even if an agreement serves many interests on both sides of the divide, that doesn’t mean it will be easy to get there. Indeed, a senior Barack Obama administration official said Thursday that “there remains a significant discrepancy between Iran’s seeming [peaceful] intent with respect to its nuclear program and the content of that nuclear program today.” It is it is not clear whether both sides have sufficient flexibility and political will to accept the compromises necessary to succeed.

In ongoing negotiations since February, stakeholders believe they have reached agreement over several difficult issues, including modifying a heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak to ensure that it produces only a tiny amount of plutonium. The underground site at Fordow will likely be used for research and development rather than large-scale enrichment of uranium, another potential bomb fuel.

On sanctions relief, President Barack Obama has sufficient authority to waive nuclear-related penalties against Iran until a key piece of legislation — the Iran Sanctions Act — expires at the end of 2016.

The key remaining sticking point is the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to retain under a long-term agreement. Iran has been demanding not only that it keep the 10,000 centrifuges it currently operates, but that it be allowed to build and install tens of thousands more to produce fuel for civilian reactors it intends to construct.

The P5+1 seek a significant reduction in centrifuges, fearing that they could be repurposed to produce bomb fuel if Iran chose to break out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and expel international inspectors.  French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has set the bar extremely low, telling French media last month that Iran could have at most “hundreds” of these machines. 

While American negotiators have not publicly put forward a number, U.S. nuclear experts have cited a range from 1,500 to 6,000 of the first generation machines known as IR-1s. (Reuters reported Thursday from Vienna that Iran has agreed to reduce its demand to have 50,000, but that is still far from satisfying the P5+1.)

Negotiators believe there are a variety of ways to resolve the centrifuge impasse. Iran could be allowed to phase out the IR-1s for a smaller number of more sophisticated machines. Restrictions on centrifuge numbers could be revisited after a period of time — perhaps five years — while caps on the level of uranium enrichment remain in place for a decade or more, if not indefinitely. Robert Einhorn, a former U.S. nuclear negotiator who is close to the U.S. team, told journalist Laura Rozen that Russia, which provides fuel for Iran’s only currently existing civilian power reactors at Bushehr, could give Iran enough fuel for five years, which Iran could stockpile on its own territory.

Some observers have suggested that Iran could be permitted more centrifuge capacity if it would be more open about possible military dimensions of the nuclear program. According to the CIA, Iran had a dedicated weapons research program from the late 1990s until at least 2003. Iran has provided some information about its past work but has not admitted that it ever intended to build nuclear weapons, and has refused access to key figures alleged to have been involved in the program.

Iran has agreed to be transparent about its declared facilities and is already allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect enrichment sites on a daily basis. Under a long-term agreement, the Islamic Republic is expected to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permitting continued close inspection. Without a deal, that access will surely be reduced and Iran would likely resume enriching uranium to levels beyond the 3.5-5 percent sufficient for generating electricity.

So will Iran and the P5+1 stop playing chicken and conclude an agreement by July 20?

Some experts anticipate a dramatic breakup of the talks, with negotiators flying home to capitals in a huff before returning with new instructions to compromise. It is likely that the foreign ministers of the P5+1 will descend on Vienna at some point to shape the final deal, as they did last year for the interim accord. The talks could go on beyond July 20; the interim agreement can be renewed for six months.

Given the progress made in addressing a very dangerous proliferation concern, stakeholders involved in the talks believe it would be tragic to allow them to fail because of differences over a few thousand centrifuges and theoretical “breakout” times for Iran to make enough fuel for one nuclear weapon.

As Kerry wrote this week in the Washington Post, “In this troubled world, the chance does not often arise to reach an agreement peacefully that will meet the essential and publicly expressed needs of all sides, make the world safer, ease regional tensions and enable greater prosperity. We have such an opportunity, and a historic breakthrough is possible. It’s a matter of political will and proving intentions, not of capacity. It’s a matter of choices. Let us all choose wisely.”

The problem, of course, is getting the different sides on the same page as to what constitutes a wise choice.