Those who do not learn history: Iraq edition
If there is anything at all gratifying about the parade of Iraq Incursion II dead-enders inundating the airways in the wake of the ISIS (or ISIL, if you’re feeling the colonial vibe) surge southward (and, I’ll admit, “gratifying” is a stretch), it is that the evolution of the media has afforded some venue for pushback.
I remember a story in Radar from about 7 years ago that was notable because it was such a rarity. The piece presented a short list of Iraq war pundits and pointed out how those who got it wrong (Friedman, Brooks, Beinhart, Zakaria and Goldberg, to name but a handful) had all been handsomely rewarded by the time this article was published, while those few who had warned against the folly were struggling to find work (Scheer, Schell and Ritter, for example).
The ensuing years have done little to upset the thesis in that post, but they have, alas, destroyed the Radar Online archive, so you’ll have to trust re-blogs and commentaries on the original story.
This week, however, along with the Cheneys and Kristols and Pollacks and Wolfowitzs littering the legacy media, there are, at least, a few more people reminding us how wrong that gang got it the first time. (Examples: Maloy, Fallows, Wheeler — and just for kicks, here’s former pro-war pundit Beinhart arguing that we should still listen to the pro-war caucus.)
But while there is something annoying and/or amusing and/or intellectually stimulating about the debate about the debate, there is something deeply troubling about seeing certain names popping up in stories, and doing so without a hint of irony.
From today’s New York Times:
Over the past two days the American ambassador, Robert S. Beecroft, along with Brett McGurk, the senior State Department official on Iraq and Iran, have met with Usama Nujaifi, the leader of the largest Sunni contingent, United For Reform, and with Ahmad Chalabi, one of the several potential Shiite candidates for prime minister, according to people close to each of those factions, as well as other political figures.
I suppose there are some who will marvel at Ahmed Chalabi’s ability to stay alive and out of prison and say it is a testament to his political skills, but reading the U.S. government is again dealing with this double-dealer’s double dealer cannot bode well for the future of a “stable Iraq.”
Also eerie, when coupled with today’s expected White House announcement that the U.S. will send about 100 Green Berets as “advisers” to the embattled Iraqi security forces, are other parts of the NYT story:
[Iraqi] political leaders have been encouraged by what they see as newfound American support for replacing Mr. Maliki with someone more acceptable to Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds, as well as to the Shiite majority.
….
Mr. Maliki, a Shiite, has marginalized other Iraqi groups, pursuing sectarian policies that are widely blamed for the ballooning Sunni insurgency that seized western Anbar province six months ago and over the past few weeks has taken territory in the north...
….
Rumors have been rife lately that the American government was trying to push Mr. Maliki into standing aside in favor of a candidate more favorable to all factions. Publicly, American officials have said no military aid would be forthcoming to Iraq until Mr. Maliki reconciles with other political factions, especially Sunnis.
The meetings on Wednesday suggested the Americans have concluded that Mr. Maliki is unable to reconcile with other factions. His actions and remarks have been increasingly uncompromising, and his decision to mobilize hundreds of thousands of Shiite volunteers has alarmed people in and out of Iraq.
Compare with some of this:
A Roman Catholic, Diệm's policies toward the Republic's Montagnard natives and its Buddhist majority were met with protests, culminating in the self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức in 1963. Amid religious protests, Diệm lost the backing of his US patrons and was assassinated, along with his brother, Ngô Đình Nhu by Nguyễn Văn Nhung, the aide of ARVN General Dương Văn Minh on 2 November 1963, during a coup d'état that deposed his government.
This is not, of course, meant to stray into “Lincoln-Kennedy Coincidence” territory — comparisons can be as dangerous as they sometimes are helpful — but this tale of American machinations from the early days of the U.S. escalation in Vietnam, should at least give the chickenhawks pause.
OK, nothing gives chickenhawks pause — but it should stand as educational background material for reporters and show bookers this time around.
And not just because of the basic “those who do not learn history” caveats against high hopes for American intervention. The caution should also apply to the lens that creates part of the parallel.
It is easy to see things as sectarian, well, frankly, because it is easy — the lines seem so clear. Diệm was a Roman Catholic who didn’t get along with the Buddhists and ethnic Degar; Maliki is Shia clashing with Sunnis and ethnic Kurds. But battles are also about territory and resources (some would argue almost exclusively so) and they play out during the long hangover of the colonial era, where foreign powers tried to exploit sectarian divisions to manage that territory and accumulate those resources.
This is not the place for long history lessons. It’s complicated. But because it is complicated, there is a place for the history in the day-to-day reporting of the news, not to mention in the formation of foreign policy.
If learning seems like too big a lift for pundits and policymakers, well, summer is the traditional season for re-runs.
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