Is there a crisis in US-Saudi relations?

Despite these differences, the U.S.-Saudi relationship will remain a central pillar of the geopolitics of the Middle East because of the fundamental interests the two countries share. For example, both place great emphasis on regional stability, the containment of Iran, the fight against Al-Qaeda, the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, most important, the reliable supply of oil at a steady price. The last factor is greatly misunderstood in the U.S., including within the Obama administration. As is well known, Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves of conventional oil in the world and the largest spare capacity (oil that remains unproduced but is readily available). These two factors make Saudi Arabia the equivalent of the central bank of oil. Because oil is a globally traded and fungible commodity, any diminution in its supply anywhere will lead to higher prices everywhere.

That the U.S. might become self-sufficient or supplied only from the Western Hemisphere does not really spell energy independence. Should Saudi production, for example, be disrupted, the global economy would be devastated, the U.S.'s included. The only way to become independent from Middle Eastern oil is to reduce drastically the domestic demand for the commodity. This can be achieved only by switching our transportation fleet to compressed natural gas, which is plentiful, or by finding a real substitute for oil's characteristics in energy density and storage or by both. Unfortunately, we appear to be decades from accomplishing these goals because of, among other factors, the prohibitive cost of converting to natural gas and the lack of scientific breakthroughs in battery technology.

Thus the U.S. and the rest of the world are tethered to the Middle East and will sooner or later pay a heavy price if this region is allowed to implode, as it is threatening to do now. The Obama administration's failure to understand that for Saudi Arabia the battle with Iran in Syria is crucial, if not existential, and that engaging with Iran as if it could be cajoled into better behavior through negotiations is to effectively turn the U.S.'s back on the most important player in the region, namely Saudi Arabia. These negotiations, despite this week's interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program, are unlikely to result in long-term success, and history teaches us that the problems of the Middle East have a nasty habit of coming back to haunt the world if the U.S. ignores them.