The Thai junta’s anti-majoritarian rule

On Aug. 20, Thailand’s rubberstamp parliament appointed junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha as the country’s prime minister, paving the way for the formation of a new interim government. In late July, nearly two months after ousting former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s democratically elected government in a bloodless coup, the military junta running Thailand declared an interim constitution that gave Prayuth sweeping powers. The unconstitutional dispensation of power has drawn comparisons to 2006’s military takeover, which tried and failed to ban then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his political party from Thai politics. As in 2006, the 2014 coup alleged Yingluck’s rule was corrupt. The latest attempt similarly promises to end corrupt politics in all forms and drastically reform the country’s electoral democracy.

While Prayuth’s appointment by a legislature he handpicked is simply procedural, the ongoing constitutional politicking suggests a dangerous backward slide into the kind of authoritarianism not seen in the country since the 1970s. The coup leaders have in essence forced Thailand back to being a bureaucratic polity, where the military, bureaucrats and business elite maintain unchecked political power over elected representatives.

The constitution already awards Prayuth the power to issue orders and suppress protests. It also allows the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) – the governing body formed after the coup – to claim that its own power is lawful while its opponents are violating law, peace and order.

There is a historical precedent for the NCPO’s totalitarian power grab. After staging a similar coup in 1959, military strongman Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat instituted martial law; section 17 of the 1959 constitution carried statutes similar to section 44 of the new constitution. Though he ruled over a dark time for Thai democracy, Sarit was popular among the people for revitalizing the Thai economy. The NCPO hopes to replicate Sarit’s model by galvanizing popular support.

However, unlike Sarit, Prayuth has yet to earn the respect and awe of the public. For example, while critics in Thailand have largely remained quiet for fear of repercussions, anti-coup activists on social media continue to poke fun at the general’s lack of charisma. The NCPO’s repressive measures against peaceful anti-coup activities — barring people from eating sandwiches, reading George Orwell’s classic novel “1984” or showing symbols of resistance such as a three-finger salute in public — have drawn public ridicule. Moreover, unlike in the 1960s, Thais today understand participatory politics and are well aware of their political and economic rights. Sooner rather than later, such stringent suppression will likely face popular challenges.

The junta’s constitution reveals its strong distaste for politicians and electoral politics. This is unsurprising: It was drafted by members of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) who were singlehandedly chosen by the junta; of 200 NLA members, 106 are military generals. It bars members of political parties from being appointed to the Cabinet until they have been party members for more than three years. It also prohibits all active politicians and voters from participating in the country’s future design, leaving political power exclusively in the hands of the military and top bureaucrats.

Such anti-democratic sentiments and distrust of politicians, particularly among the urban middle class, have long dominated Thai politics. The trend began in the late 1980s, when then-Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan’s Cabinet was ridiculed as a highly corrupt “buffet.” The military toppled his government in 1991 after two and a half years, to little public opposition. Since 1992, several elected governments have faced corruption scandals and were similarly forced out of office before serving full terms.

Military intervention has traditionally been seen as an effective step to end corruption. For example, protests led by the yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy repeatedly urged the military to intervene and end entrenched corruption in Thaksin’s government, a wish that was fulfilled by the 2006 coup. However, despite concerted efforts by the judiciary, army, Democrat Party and media to ban Thaksin and his allies, Thaksinite parties made a comeback, winning a parliamentary majority in the 2007 and 2011 elections.

Popular support from rural communities played a large role in ensuring Thaksinite parties’ electoral successes. This is another familiar political grievance: Rural voters are generally viewed as unqualified to vote, prone to selling their votes in exchange for short-term personal gains. Conservative elites have long alleged the rural regions of northern and northeastern Thailand are susceptible to “vote buying.” (During last year’s protests, the anti-Thaksin movement led by Democrat leader Suthep Thuagsuban, which paved the way for the latest coup, loudly echoed these sentiments and managed to obstruct early elections planned for February.)

Most of these allegations are not true. A number of recent studies confirm (PDF) that vote buying is no longer a decisive factor in election results and that voters are increasingly motivated instead by development projects. For example, schemes such as universal healthcare coverage and rural-based funding projects have significantly enhanced the livelihood and political participation of local people. But inflammatory political rhetoric from Bangkok-based intelligentsia and media continues to paint a picture of rural voters easily bribed by populist policies, which in turn fuels the middle class’s distrust in electoral politics.

The junta has taken several steps to pre-empt future populist politicians and policies — at all levels. On July 3, shortly after the coup, it ordered its legal arm to include permanent constitutional measures preventing populist policies that it claimed could endanger the Thai economy. On July 15, the NCPO issued another order suspending local administrative elections, including provincial, sub-district and Bangkok’s district council elections. Instead, it appointed government officials to replace members of these agencies when the current officials’ terms expire.

The 1997 constitution and 1999’s Decentralization Act mandate local agencies to provide public services to their constituents. Research shows that their work has improved local services and the quality of living, as well as increased public participation. But the media, anti-democracy academics and the anti-graft agencies continue to lament widespread corruption and nepotism in community-based projects run by local administrative units.

Prayuth plans to undertake yearlong political reforms and reconciliation before holding a new election in late 2015. Even if it strengthens check-and-balance mechanism on corrupt politicians as promised, the reforms Prayuth is trying to create will certainly erode Thailand’s electoral democracy by reducing the power of majority voters. It will ensure that rural voters will not have a say in who represents them in government. Unfortunately for these voters, the military regime will remain stable as long as its suppressive machinery is intact. The prosperity the junta promises to create will serve elites and the urban middle class in Bangkok. It will also deepen the precarious social rifts in Thailand.