Ukraine: Are other regions in danger?

There have been big changes in the map of the world over the past quarter century. The Soviet Union broke up into 16 countries. Czechoslovakia into two. When the Yugoslavs decided they no longer wanted to share one country, the Slovenes left quietly, while Croats, Bosnians and Serbs fought a vicious civil war, then Montenegro negotiated its way out of Serbia, and Kosovo got autonomy after international intervention.   

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has swiftly run through versions of these options. Will the story end peacefully or violently? In the aftermath of the Crimean referendum, are other regions in danger from Russian land grabs? And how will the international community react?

We consulted three experts for the Inside Story.

Russia is massing troops on Ukraine’s southern and eastern borders. Will it define Ukraine’s borders militarily?

Robert Hunter: We don’t know what is in [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s mind. My sense is that he has made his point about gaining respect and gaining historically Russian territory and rallying domestic support through patriotism in light of sluggish economy. He would be a fool to build upon that in areas where there is no case to be made for legitimacy. I won’t rule it out, but it would be an even worse miscalculation than what he has already made.

One of the areas he might have his eyes on is Transnistria. It does not even touch Russia, so taking it would require yet another invasion of a sovereign country. That would be even less tolerated by the international community.
 

What should the United States and the European Union be doing right now?

More or less what we are doing now, which is to take actions that are fundamentally symbolic. Even the ones that go to these so-called cronies — they will find ways to shield themselves, and countries do not make decisions on that basis anyway. The point is to let Russia know that we are paying attention and reassure NATO countries and Ukraine that they have their support. I would suggest we need to keep rhetoric in bound and not make threats we cannot keep. I hope no one anywhere gets the impression that we are weak and can be taken advantage of. An awful lot of people have done in the past and have paid a price for it.

Is there still room for the U.S. to restore good faith by accommodating Russia more? Did we make this bed by expanding NATO to Russia’s borders, taking sides in Ukraine?

If I looked at this solely from a Russian point of view — I don’t do it, and I’m not saying we should do it — there are indeed many things that we did that could be perceived as taking advantage of Russia while it was weak after the Cold War. I’m talking about the division of Kosovo, the expansion of NATO to include Baltic states and the invasion of Iraq. These are all examples of things the Russians believe involved taking advantage of them. And we did go too far in some cases. The question is now that Putin has said, “I’m here. I’m taking Crimea. You can’t take advantage of me. Let’s move on and do business.” In the long term, the cost of sanctions for the Russian economy — and it will take some time — is not worth boosting Russian pride.

Will the current crisis in Crimea escalate further?

Nicu Popescu: We have obviously been wrong about Putin so far. Every expert got Crimea wrong. From now on, everything might happen. They might continue with their advantage and escalate into a military advantage in eastern Ukraine. Or they might threaten and then backtrack. Either of these is equally plausible. From an international standpoint, the biggest problem is that everything is dependent on Putin’s whim. It is not a good thing for European security to wait and see what Putin does without a plan and having a way to influence it.
 

What would be a good way for the West to influence Putin’s next move?

The domestic political benefits have been strongly positive for Putin so far. The only question is whether the West can make it cost more in the mid-term to ensure it will not occur again. If the current intervention does not cost a lot for Putin, then we might see the temptation for further intervention. Maybe not this year but in three years, five years, 10 years, he might try it again in Moldova or elsewhere. Putin probably lost a little momentum for eastern Ukraine, so you might see intervention in eastern Ukraine later, but it will probably only be a brief negotiation for recognition of Crimea. I don’t think Transnistria is a huge advantage for Russia. It is close to Odessa, though, which has pro-Russian sentiment. So in theory, he could use it to destabilize eastern Ukraine. Also, northern Kazakhstan, under [President Nursultan] Nazarbayev — they have been good about keeping Russia happy while building ties to China and the U.S. 

No room for saving Russia’s pride and greater accommodation?

The West has been trying and is still trying. Look at the sanctions. It has been a very gradual rollout to the point where the first round was laughed off in Russia. There is still a way out for Russia that will save face. But this has been interpreted in Russia as weakness and as a signal to press their advantage.
 

Then do you support bigger sanctions?

We’ll see what happens in eastern Ukraine. People understand Crimea is gone. If there is a destabilization, then bigger sanctions will come. The only question is, Will it be reactive? Where Russia stops will determine where the U.S. and West sanctions stop.

Putin mobilizing troops near eastern Ukraine – what does it signal?

Nikolai Zlobin: I think Putin is motivated mostly by a domestic agenda. I can see the Russian perspective. Crimea was always part of a domestic agenda. For Russians, it is not a foreign policy issue, which is important to understand. It is a kind of historical justice. Whatever Putin does, he is thinking of his domestic reaction. He does not need to pressure Ukraine or Western Europe. He must tend to his home. He must protect his elite, which is disturbed by sanctions, and Russia’s general population, which is behind him.

Putin might proceed with his military because Russians support it. Russia would be less concerned about eastern Ukraine than southern Ukraine, such as Odessa and the ports, which have strategic value. People have concerns about Transnistria, which is the same kind of environment. If Putin goes through southern Ukraine, he can reach those areas very easily. Many years ago, Transnistria voted in a referendum to join Russia. There are many scenarios he can play. He can wait on the public. He has all the time in the world.

If it is all about domestic politics, does the West have any leverage?

I do not support sanctions because it leads to public rallying behind Putin. And it pushes Russia into a corner and could deepen a cold war. Putin asked this many times, and no one answered. The U.S. should start to consider Russian national interests and stop looking it as the country that lost the Cold War. Russia is very deeply offended by it. It wants respect and equality for Russian interests, which it definitely has in Ukraine. If I were an American politician, I would show that I care about Russia’s interests. Do not put [Ukrainians] in a position where they feel they have to choose Russia or the West. It must be Russia and the West.
 

But how does the U.S. show that, practically?

There will be an election in Ukraine this spring that will be a field for compromise. There are certain areas of compromise in the Black Sea with Turkey. Also, there is room for compromise in the energy sector. There are a lot of tools to make Russia more agreeable that have not been used in the past six months. 

This panel was assembled for the broadcast of “Inside Story.”

For future hard-hitting conversations, find Al Jazeera America on your TV.