George Mitchell talks to Tony Harris

Tony Harris: What, if anything, has surprised you about the deteriorating security situation in Iraq?

George Mitchell: There are three internal conflicts that are overlapping and intersecting throughout the Islamic world. First is a Sunni-Shia split, which began as a struggle for political power following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. That's going on around the world. It's a huge factor in Iraq now, in Syria and in other countries. You also have the conflict which exists in both Sunni and Shia communities between those who want to establish theocratic, exclusionary states in which there isn't tolerance for any other form of faith. I think women are not generally as independent, as empowered as they are in other parts of the world. The third conflict, embroiling many countries in the Islamic world, is the internal division between the ruling power, often a monarchy, frequently a military dictatorship, and the opposition, which tends to be centered around the Muslim Brotherhood in many of the countries of the world. But there are very many variations of that. Now, the United States is the dominant military and economic power in the world. And from that, we derive many benefits. We also incur many burdens. The first thing we have to get clear is that despite our immense power and our immense wealth as a nation, we do not have the capacity to solve every problem in the world. Not every problem in the world is an American problem requiring an exclusively American solution. Problems have to be solved locally. We believe in the right of self-governance. It's in the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. And self-governance means that other people have the right to govern themselves.

But, Senator, as I travel around the world — not to the extent that you have — I am shocked by the extent to which people around the world feel that America has contributed to many of the problems of the world or is in a unique position to solve all of the problems around the world. You find that as well?

Absolutely inevitable, and has been true of every dominant power in human history. Dominance creates a sense of dependency, and dependency always creates, to some degree, a sense of resentment by those who are dependent upon and those who they depend on. That's just a reality. That comes with the territory. We have to be strong enough, secure enough and mature enough to recognize that and, notwithstanding that, do what we can. And much of the criticism of the United States, which I get just as you do, traveling around the world, comes from a widespread perception that our actions fall short of our values and principles. The reality is that most people admire what we think of as American principles, but which are really universal. They are the principles upon which our democracy is founded. Most of them don't have all of that in their societies. They like it about us, but then they look at our actions and they say, "Well, those actions don't comport with that." The truth is, no individual, no country fully meets its aspirations at all times.

Did the war in Iraq violate in some way our values, our principles?

It was contrary to some.

To some, OK.

But look, that's the reality. Here's my view. We have made mistakes. Clearly, the basis on which the war was initiated, that Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons, was incorrect. But I have to say, I believe that if you look across the broad sweep of human history, the United States has done more good, has been closer to meeting its aspirations and values, than have other countries in the past. Of course, we've made mistakes. Human beings all are imperfect. But we've tried hard to do the right thing, and we have corrected our mistakes when they've been made. Let me emphasize that. I believe that one of the great strengths of the United States is the willingness and the capacity to confront error and to correct it, both domestically, internally — where we've made a lot of huge mistakes — and in foreign affairs.

How does the United States correct Iraq, if you see it as a problem that the United States needs to correct? And [can] the rise in the Islamist movement in the Middle East be directly related, attributed to the war in Iraq?

I strongly disagree with that.

I thought you might.  

Go back and read history. The history of Iraq didn't begin with the American invasion. There's been conflict for hundreds of years. So the notion that conflict began with the United States I think is plainly false and contradicted now. We do have a problem. We should help, but ultimately, it is the people of Iraq who will decide the future of Iraq, the people of Syria who will decide the future of Syria, Egyptians who will decide the future of Egypt. We can help. We should encourage. We should insist, especially for those, and there are many, who want more open, tolerant, modern regimes, who want governments that provide the basic services that give people opportunity, jobs, schools, health care. That's what people want and we can do what we can to help, but we cannot view this as it is the responsibility of the United States to fix what's happening in Iraq. We've got to help the Iraqis fix what's happening in Iraq. The really tough part of democracy, which we are still struggling with as the greatest and the longest continuous democracy in history, the really tough part is, how do you reconcile the two pillars of democracy? Majority rules, but you protect minority rights. We have a tough time with it and those countries have a tough time with it, and you can see what's happening in Egypt now, in Syria now, in Iraq now, in that context. The Iraqis have to have an inclusionary government. It's a country with Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. They've got to be involved and they've got to develop — they've got to get away from the concept that if one group is in power, the other group is out.

To what extent is the Sunni-Shia divide that we see, particularly in the Middle East, to what extent is that about sect, about religion? And to what extent is it about two proud countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and geopolitics and control and dominance in that region?

Well, you mentioned seven factors and they're all involved. This is not an easy thing to sort out. This is not two plus two equals four. 

But these issues are issues you've been sorting your entire career.

Trying to sort out. Neither I nor anyone else has the complete answer, any of these problems. I do not favor the position taken by some that we should simply withdraw and leave them to their own devices. I think we do have a critical interest in stability there, if nothing else, to prevent the situation that existed prior to and during 9/11, when people had free rein to organize and mount attacks against the United States in the United States. It's in our interest to have an aggressive and active posture there. And there are a lot of other economic and moral reasons as well. But we got to get out of the notion that we're responsible for everything. 

When did President [Barack] Obama ask you to go to the Middle East and work on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 2009?

About two weeks before he was inaugurated in office. 

What did you think was possible?

Well, I don't accept that anything is impossible. I think you've got to have a positive attitude on things. Otherwise, you might as well not try. If you start a task saying, "Well, I think I'm going to fail," then you sure are going to fail. And you can't be deterred by past failures. The reality is, if you're interested in peace and you're asked to do it — from my view, as someone who has lived the American dream, if a president of the United States asks me to do a job, I do it. 

Can you explain to the American people in as simple and straightforward a way as possible what it is about that conflict that makes reaching an agreement so difficult?

Just remember. Before we got an agreement in Northern Ireland, the same question was asked of me.

You're the man to ask this question.

Yes, but that was hundreds of years old. Four days before we reached an agreement in Northern Ireland, a public opinion poll was published, which showed that 83 percent of the public believed no agreement was possible. And I believe, in fact, that an agreement to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is so much in the interests of both societies that they will come to an agreement.

Beyond that, you say in your lifetime. How long are you planning —

Well, I'm pretty old, so I don't know about my lifetime, but I hope it is in a lifetime. So it's politically very difficult in divided societies. But I believe that for both sides, the disadvantages of not getting an agreement are much greater than the difficulties that will come with getting an agreement. I think that will become increasingly clear to both of them.

You've been in the room with these two sides. Do you see these leaders as being able to forge the kind of agreement that would — well, you know where I'm going.

They have so far not demonstrated that they can or will do so. I think in large part because the leaders individually do personify and represent the dominant views in their society, which is mistrust of the other side. Both sides said to me, "I'm serious. I want to get this done, but is he?" — pointing in the general direction of the other. So there is a huge gulf of mistrust of the intentions of the other side that exists throughout the conflict. However, that will continue until they actually do reach an agreement and will probably continue even then. My argument is that I believe ultimately individuals and nations and groups of people act out of self-interest. And I think their self-interest is very, very much in the direction of getting an agreement, because of the huge disadvantages that will occur. For Israel, although it is in a position of overwhelming military dominance and economic strength in comparison to the Palestinians, really measured in every way, they face serious problems in the future, demography in that region, demography is moving strongly in the other direction, and they soon will face a circumstance where the number of Arabs exceeds the number of Jews in the region.

Secondly, the military threat now doesn't come from tanks and armies crossing the border. It comes from rockets. Iran has developed rockets that can reach Israel when launched from Iran and Hezbollah and Hamas pose threats. Thirdly, isolation. Israel's support in the United States is very strong, particularly in the House of Representatives, and will continue to be. The United States has an unshakable commitment to Israel's security, but its support is gradually declining in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe and in Asia.

Now for the Palestinians, they face a similar problem. I told both Chairman [Yasser] Arafat directly — I did two tours of duty over there, the first one when Arafat was in power, the second one with [President Mahmoud] Abbas — I told both of them directly, "In 1947, the United Nations proposed a partition of the region to create two countries." Israel accepted the proposal. The Arabs rejected it. The first war started, won by Israel, as has every war since then. I believe most sensible Arabs today would gladly accept the ’47 proposal if it were still on the table, but it isn't and it never again will be. And the Palestinians have rejected every proposal since then. What I said to Arafat and later to Abbas was, "There's no evidence that the options are going to get any better for you. Indeed, all of the evidence is that the options are getting worse the longer you go, so you've got to sit down in negotiations, stay in negotiations with the active support and sustained support of the United States and many other countries that want to help and get an agreement to create a state.

"It will be less than what you're asking for. You will probably think it unfair, but the reality is, once you get a state, you can then build on it." And I believe they can. The Palestinians are energetic, able, entrepreneurial people. I think they can create a successful state, but they have to get it.  It means making concessions. It means accepting less than what you want. The same is true of the Israelis. They will have to make concessions. Now on the Israeli side, the argument against what I've said, made directly to me by Israeli officials is that, "Well, it won't work, because the Palestinians may fail as a state. The Palestinian Authority may collapse. Hamas may take over, and we have a mortal threat right on our border." And that is a valid argument. 

You see that as a valid argument.

That is a very valid argument. The problem is, as I argue, that is more likely to occur in the absence of an agreement than if you get an agreement. The collapse of the Palestinian Authority is not only likely, it's probably inevitable if they don't, at some point in time, reach an agreement, because what President Abbas has courageously said is that, "I don't believe violence is the way. I believe it's got to be peaceful, nonviolent negotiation." But sooner or later, if you try that 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, 40 years, and it doesn't work, it'll be discredited and people will say, "Well, the only alternative is violence." And many do say that now. 

Can you bridge that trust deficit?

I don't think I or any third person or third entity can bridge that trust. I think ultimately that must come from them. 

Can we talk about America? How would you describe America's political and economic house at the moment?

Well, I think our economy is coming back, thank goodness, more slowly than we wanted and less broadly than we wanted and it'll be in a different form. Every major recession and the Depression produced a different American economy, one that because of its flexibility and adaptability met with changing circumstances, now perhaps more challenging than ever, particularly with the dramatic increase in population that we're experiencing. In politics, it's rough. On the day that I was elected Senate majority leader, one of the first persons I called was Bob Dole, who was the Republican leader, and I asked if I could come to see him. He said, "Sure, come on down." I went down to his office. I talked to him. I said, "Look," I said, "you've been here 20 years. I've only been here a couple of years. You know a lot more than I do, but I have seen enough to know that the leaders of the Senate" — the majority leader, which I then was, and the minority leader, which he was — "can't function effectively if there's no trust between us. We have to have trust to get anything done." So I said, "I'm here to tell you how I intend to behave toward you and to ask you to behave in the same way toward me." And I laid out the most basic standards of fairness. "I'll never surprise you. I won't attack you personally. I'll try to stay on the issues." He was delighted. We shook hands, and I'm proud to say to you that to this moment, to this very moment, never once has a harsh word passed between Bob Dole and I, in public or in private. He won some, but we knew all along that we had a higher responsibility to the people of this country and to the Senate.

Senator, but there's so much acrimony in our politics I can't even imagine that kind of relationship today.

No, that's right. It's very difficult and getting worse, although I think you have to have this bit of context. We all look at the past through rose-colored glasses.  There never was a time when everything was buddy-buddy and rosy-rosy and cheery-cheery and no disputes. Disputes are inevitable. Remember, the American system, economic, political, social, cultural, sports, is built on competition. We believe competition is good. Nobody advocates a one-party state. We want two opposing, competing parties because we think out of that adversarial relationship will come a better result. So where's the line between good competition and bad partisanship? How do you draw the line? And that's a difficult thing to do, particularly in the context that we're in. So it's always been rough. Go back and read a history of the presidential election of 1800. Worse than anything Obama and [Mitt] Romney ever said about each other. So it's always been rough. But now the combination of unconscionable sums of money — the rigid ideology — increasingly the House of Representatives is through gerrymandering already decided. Eighty percent of the seats, you know which party's going to win, so the pivotal moment in politics in the House of Representatives is the primary election, and very few people participate. That means the strongly held — the strong ideological groups have a disproportionate voice. A whole bunch of factors — but it is dysfunctional. I hope very much that the American people will demand, clearly and loudly, a change and then we'll have the necessary change.

This interview has been edited and condensed.